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Abstract 
We offer an interpretation of the concept of integrity and quality of science, based on semiotics. 
We argue that science can be seen the part of a semiotic process, in charge of making useful 
representations of relevant events. In turn the semiotic process then tests the usefulness these 
representations in an impredicative way. The preservation of the semiotic process requires a 
continuous update the set of identities assigned to the functional and structural components 
making up the society, which can only be obtained by adopting pertinent representations.  In 
this process, the quality of information is defined as “fitness for purpose”, not as an universal 
value. The fitness of scientific information depends on the definitions of what is useful, what is 
relevant and for whom, which are all dependent on a previous definition of the “we” (the self of 
the semiotic process).  The integrity of a semiotic process can be defined as the capacity to 
produce and use a pool of meanings associated with recorded information required to guide 
action and to preserve in this way the identity of an autopoietic system (a system producing 
itself). The complex organization of the semiotic process in human societies implies that the 
preservation of the identity of the whole is the result of a continuous negotiation and 
deliberation over the identities of the lower level constituent components.  In reflexive systems 
there are several distinct definitions of identity that have to be negotiated across levels of 
organization (individuals, households, communities, countries, etc.). The feeling of living in a 
post-truth world signals a failure in the task of preserving the integrity of the semiotic process. 
The production and use of information in the step “represent”, required for guiding action across 
different levels of organization, has lost coherence across the different obsolete definition of 
identities and the process is not capable of generating an integrated set of new ones at the 
required pace. Crises of science are coupled with social and political crises in an impredicative 
way: the representation provided by science is no longer useful for society and the validation 
provided by society to the information used to guide action is no longer useful for science. This 
requires a move from a substantive use of science as a source of facts about the world, to a more 
reflexive use of science as a source of useful information about concerns: how to deal with the 
tragedy of change. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we offer an out-of-the-box interpretation of integrity and quality in science, based 
on semiotics, complexity theory, and thermodynamics. Societies are defined as complex 
adaptive, becoming and anticipatory systems. The process of decision making in societies is 
described as a semiotic process, in which signs (observations about the external world) are used 
to make sense of the external world and guide action. Within this framing, we suggest that 
science can be seen as a set of institutionalized activities taking place inside the semiotic process 
carried out by societies.  This interpretation is compatible with the key elements used to define 
science in dictionaries: a system for acquiring knowledge, a systematic generation of knowledge 
through observation and experimentation, watching, measuring and doing experiments to 
describe and explain natural phenomena. 
In our semiotic narrative science is the functional component of society specialized in 
interpreting signs coming from the external world to build useful perceptions that are used to 
generate representations of events. Scientific representations provide explanations of causality 
over observed interactions by adopting specific disciplinary lenses. Explanations are used to 
develop anticipatory models, that is, to provide advice on action that should be taken based on 
expected future states. An example of anticipatory model provided by science in the semiotic 
process is the call for mitigation and adaptation actions based on the expected future state of 
climatic change.  
It should be noted that in the past the role of knowledge producer in society was not a monopoly 
of science. A variety of forms of knowledge associated with religious beliefs, superstitions, 
traditional wisdom built on recorded and shared experiences, and cultural norms were all 
legitimate factors used in the process of decision making. With the emergence of modern 
science, these alternative forms of knowledge required to preserve the plurality of meanings 
associated with existing representations have been progressively marginalized – not in praxis, 
but at least in the official story-telling. The scientific revolution has contributed to generate a 
general consensus that scientific knowledge – a typology of representations based on a given 
taxonomy of signs valid by default for a given taxonomy of interpretants – could substitute the 
various forms of traditional knowledge through a unifying grand narrative, as exemplified by the 
Encyclopedia of Diderot and d’Alembert.   
We share some of Lyotard’s (1979) scepticism towards grand narratives and argue that in post-
modern societies quality and integrity are necessarily context-specific concepts. In semiotics, 
the meaning of the signs is determined by the perception of the interpretants. Therefore the 
ability of preserving meaning depends on the coupling between the typology of signs (assumed 
to carry a given meaning) and the typology of interpretants (the intended users of the signs). 
Quality and integrity cannot be assessed without addressing the special relation between the 
sign (why that sign? A sign produced when and by whom?) and the interpretant (who are the 
interpretants? When and where do they interpret the sign?).  
The problem of matching signs and interpretant becomes overwhelming in a situation in which 
the semiotic process is subject to a dramatic acceleration, such as during revolutions. The 
definition of the identity of both the observer (the self as determined by the semiotic process) 
and the observed (the other as determined by the representation of the external world) change 
at a speed that cannot be handled by the existing institutional settings. In relation to this point, 
in order to propose a heterodox explanation of the challenges of quality and integrity that 
modern science is experiencing in the post-truth days, we start from scratch, framing the 
discussion of the role of science in the semiotic process. This requires introducing a few concepts 
useful to understand and describe the role of knowledge in the functioning of self-organising, 
adaptive, and reflexive systems. We then provide in section 3 a description of the role of science 
in the process of decision making of modern societies. After having illustrated the theoretical 
concepts on which the paper is based, we provide an alternative to contextualization of the use 
of the terms integrity and quality in relation to scientific activity in section 4.  Section 5 concludes 
the paper with a forward outlook.  
 
2. Theoretical concepts from the field of complexity used to explain the functioning of complex 
adaptive systems 
This section uses concepts from complexity theory, thermodynamics, and semiotics to discuss 
the role of information in self-organizing systems, and then draws a parallel with the role of 
scientific knowledge in society. We draw from a broad literature to take the following steps: 
first, we introduce the concept of dissipative systems and discuss the question of identity in far-
from-equilibrium becoming systems. Second, we argue that becoming systems are anticipatory 
systems rather than reactive systems. Anticipation requires purposes and beliefs. We show that 
purpose may be realized in structural and functional system components, but there is no one-
to-one mapping between function and structure. Third, we introduce the concept of holon to 
handle the duality between function and structure. Constituent components at once define their 
identity and the identity of the whole through multiple mappings between functional and 
structural components. Fourth, we use Peirce’s semiotic process to describe how science is used 
by complex adaptive social systems. Finally, we explain the semiotic process of societies as a 
challenge of a plurality of reflexive and self-aware holon-like individuals that define their own 
identity and that of society, and reflexively engage with the multiple identities they constitute 
and are constituted by. 
 
Step 1: Self-organizing systems become something else in time 
An important contribution to the study of complex systems comes from non-equilibrium 
thermodynamics. For our discussion we focus on the concept of dissipative systems (Glansdorff 
and Prigogine 1971; Nicolis and Prigogine 1977). Dissipative systems face a systemic existential 
predicament. Dissipative systems are open systems, which means that they must be able to 
preserve an identity that makes them different from their context but at the same time they are 
made-up of their context because of their openness. Schrödinger (1967) in his seminal book 
“What is life?” explains this predicament by proposing the concept of negative entropy (a 
blasphemy in classic thermodynamics). The expression of a metabolic pattern requires a 
continuous consumption of useful inputs (taken from the context) and the continuous 
production of useless wastes (dumped into the context). The metabolic process that expresses 
the identity of a dissipative system must be capable of stabilizing in time an integrated set of 
structural and functional elements required to reproduce the system over time. This 
stabilization entails a dialectic relation with the environment: the very activities that sustain the 
existence of metabolic systems (e.g. consumption of natural resources) destroy the admissible 
environment on which they depend. To make things more difficult, the openness of dissipative 
systems implies that it is not simple to define what these systems are. No matter the complexity 
of the dissipative structure – from a simple tornado to a complex megacity – dissipative systems 
are always composed of two types of constituent component:  
(i) The dissipative structure – the set of structural and functional elements that produce positive 
entropy (+dSi); and  
(ii) The support system – the set of processes taking place in the context required to restore the 
favorable gradients destroyed by the dissipative structure.  These processes must generate an 
adequate flux of negative entropy (-dSe).   
This forced mutual relation between the two constituent components of dissipative systems is 
visualized by the famous equation proposed by Prigogine: dSDS = +dSi – dSe.  This equation clearly 
frames the predicament of dissipative structures – including modern societies. Their survival 
(the possibility of increasing +dSi according to processes controlled by humans) depends on a 
set of processes that generate the required flux of negative entropy (-dSe) on which the 
dissipative structure does not have any control and cannot fully predict. This condition implies 
the systemic presence of uncertainty about the stability of existing favorable boundary 
conditions. Uncertainty about the stability of favorable boundary conditions can be seen in the 
panic generated in ancient history by eclipses and the possibility of climate change nowadays. 
This predicament is more pronounced in modern societies, whose metabolic systems grow both 
in (i) size and (ii) pace of activity per unit of size.  The more the economy grows, the more the 
stability of uncontrollable processes that determine –dSe becomes important. 
In summary, whereas simple dissipative systems, such as a tornado or a whirlpool, have a local 
identity fully determined and dependent on ephemeral boundary conditions, modern 
economies managed to operate over large time intervals (centuries) and large spatial domains 
(they cover nowadays the entire planet) while maintaining their identity. To obtain this result, 
modern economies have learned how to control and adapt to unavoidable changes in boundary 
conditions. Since thermodynamic laws force human societies to be “becoming systems” 
(Prigogine 1978), they must be able to be effective “anticipatory systems” (Rosen 1985). 
Anticipatory systems purposefully change their behavior to maintain their identity, as opposed 
to reactive systems that change as a consequence of changes in the context. 
 
Step 2: Learning requires purposes and beliefs 
Anticipation can be defined as using expectations about the future to guide present action (Poli 
2017). This definition is based on the concept of “anticipatory systems” (Rosen 1985), which are 
defined as: “an anticipatory system is one in which present change of state depends upon future 
circumstances, rather than merely on the present or the past. As such, anticipation has routinely 
been excluded from any kind of systematic study, on the grounds that it violates the causal 
foundation on which all of theoretical science must rest” (Rosen 1985: v). Anticipation requires 
self-referentiality, the ability of both reproducing oneself (process of fabrication) and of making 
models (to be used in the system of control) of oneself interacting with the external world.  
Several concepts have been proposed to explain the self-referentiality of living systems: (i) 
Rosen (1985; 1991) called this class of system Metabolic-Repair systems (M-R systems) and 
defined them as “closed to efficient cause”. M-R systems are able to reproduce and repair 
themselves through their metabolic activity and they contain models of themselves that enable 
them to be their own makers; (ii) H.T. Odum (1971; 1983) in theoretical ecology provided a 
similar description of processes that enable ecosystems to reproduce themselves, which he 
called “informed autocatalytic loops”; (iii) Margalef described the organization of an ecosystem 
as “a channel which projects information [to itself] into the future” (Margalef 1968: 17); (iv) 
Maturana and Varela (1980) proposed the concept of autopoietic systems. “Autopoiesis literally 
means self-production or self-creation, and is a term for the "self-defining", "circular" 
organization (organizationally closed but structurally, i.e., materially and energetically, open) of 
a living system (such as a cell), consisting of a network of component metabolites that produces 
the very network and its own components plus the boundary of this network” (Emmeche 1997).   
All these conceptualization have three points in common: (i) the key role played by information 
in the process of self-organization; (ii) a distinction between the self and the other in the analysis 
of the interactions; and (iii) the presence of the self in the anticipatory models of interaction.   
Adaptation based on recorded information requires learning and learning requires the creation 
of notional systems. A human activity system can be defined as a “notional system” (i.e. not 
existing in any tangible form) (Patching 1990), if the activities undertaken achieve some purpose. 
In relation to this point, Pattee proposed the concept of semantic closure:  “Metaphorically, life 
is matter with meaning. Less metaphorically, organisms are material structures with memory by 
virtue of which they construct, control and adapt to their environment. Evolution entails 
semantic information, and open-ended evolution requires an epistemic cut between the 
genotype and phenotype, i.e., between description and construction” (Pattee 1995: 24). 
According to Pattee (1995), semantic closure is the process that makes it possible for life to add 
meaning to matter. Meaning can only be obtained by creating notional information in the 
description of the functioning of systems and testing the usefulness of this information by using 
it to: (i) construct structural elements; and (ii) control the activity of functional elements. This 
iterative commuting between producing information (in notional terms) and testing information 
(in the external world) has been suggested also by other authors. For example, Simon (1962) 
argues that life is a process of resonance between making recipes used for making processes 
used for making recipes, and Prigogine and Stengers (1984) assert that life is a process that uses 
DNA to express a metabolism capable of reproducing the DNA. The rationale of this process of 
storing memory of past experience is at the basis of the discipline of biosemiotics - an 
interdisciplinary approach that studies the modalities and the role of signification in living 
systems. Von Uexküll (1957) developed the theory considering animals as interpreters of their 
environment (for a detailed history of the field see (Kull 1999). 
It is important to observe that recording information is not enough in order to be able to learn. 
There is something more that living systems must have in order to be able to learn (Pattee 1995). 
A learning system must have: 
1. A purpose associated with its own identity. The definition of a purpose makes it possible 
to compare the expected result with the achieved result – i.e. the feed-back from the 
external world that can be used to check the validity of the information.  Purpose makes 
it possible to distinguish a success from a failure and to learn; 
2. A belief associated with recorded knowledge determining the operation of a system of 
control. The belief indicates what should be done to achieve a specific goal in a given 
situation. In adaptive systems, beliefs are updated through feedback; 
3. A system of control with contingency.  Contingency is essential because it determines 
the difference between physical laws and semiotic controls. For example, the behavior 
of a flame is determined by the characteristics of an attractor regulated by physical laws.  
A flame cannot learn how to behave in a different way: it is a simple dissipative system 
fully determined by its boundary conditions. On the contrary, the behavior of an 
organism (e.g. a cat) is determined by both the characteristics of its structural 
organization and by its semiotic controls. Both of the structural organization and the 
system of control can be adjusted. Controls reflect the information accumulated 
(memory) by the species-ecosystem complex, to which the organism belongs, in past 
interactions with the external world; 
4. Validation through action. Semiotic closure can only be obtained by testing beliefs in 
relation to the purpose in the chosen semiotic control.  Depending on the results, the 
system can adjust the structural organization, the semiotic control, the belief or, as a 
last resort, the purpose. This validation requires generating instances (material 
observables in physical system) of the types described by the recorded information 
(immaterial observables in notional systems). 
As explained in Giampietro (2018) “Note that changes in semiotic controls can refer to two 
different things: (i) the definition of the structural organization of the system and its parts; and 
(ii) the effectiveness of anticipatory models. For example, a simple anticipatory model used by 
a cockroach could be “light equals danger” (the belief) coupled to the normative narrative 
(system of control) “if there is light, then run for darkness”. This type of information, coupling a 
“belief” to a “system of control”, may be applied to different structural types (e.g. cockroaches, 
silver fishes, and earwigs)”. In the alternative, change could occur through the development of 
more sophisticated structural elements (e.g. a dog) that can express a more effective set of 
semiotic controls. 
The analysis given by Pattee (1995) is based on a combination of biosemiotics and cybernetics 
used to explain how complex self-producing system can learn. In self-reproducing metabolic 
systems the mechanism of entropy generation is determined by semiotic controls, which define 
constraints that reflect the effect of adjustable rules and not of inexorable laws. The difference 
between rules and laws is essential because it represents one of the prerequisites of learning 
from anticipation. This distinction implies that the identity and the functioning of complex 
adaptive systems can only be studied by considering a few immaterial observables – i.e. 
purposes, beliefs, semiotic controls – which play a key role in the definition of the behaviour of 
self-referential systems.  On a basic level, all living systems have the purpose of remaining alive 
and reproducing themselves. They do so by generating and using information about themselves 
(beliefs). Reflexive systems such as human systems can add additional purposes to their identity. 
 
Step 3: The epistemological conundrum of the holon  
Self-organizing adaptive systems effectively use recorded information by generating and 
preserving the meaning of codes, as studied by codepoiesis (Barbieri 2012; 2015). Recorded 
information can be used to make structures, i.e. DNA or blueprints used to generate equivalence 
classes of structural elements, and to make system of control that store experience.   
In a metabolic network, made of self-reproducing elements, information is generated and 
reproduced in two non-equivalent ways:  
(i) Directly, through blueprints used to produce the structural elements that operate 
the network nodes (e.g., DNA or blueprint for human artefacts). Blueprints can be 
thought of as information stored in the system of control. The blueprint is the 
genetic information that produces equivalence classes of organisms (populations 
belonging to the same species, e.g., rabbits, deer, horses), determining upward 
causation; and  
(ii) Indirectly, by building mutual information inside complex adaptive systems, 
determined by the forced impredicative relations between the different 
characteristics of the constituent components.  That is, a metabolic network defines 
a network niche for the functional nodes – what the network expects the specific 
constituent components to do. The characteristics of a structural element of the 
network niche must be compatible with the expected characteristics of the 
functional element defined by the mutual information of the network.  This mutual 
information determines downward causation. For example, mutual information is 
associated with the amount of biomass that herbivores obtain from plants and the 
biomass they transfer to carnivores. The congruence requirement defines how 
many elements of the various equivalence classes – populations of plants, 
populations of herbivorous, and populations of carnivorous – can be reproduced in 
a given ecosystem.  
In the formation of ecological holarchies, there are several identities that define each other in 
an impredicative way – by integrating upward and downward causation through an 
impredicative set of relations – cells, tissues, organs, organisms, populations, ecological niches 
associated with species, ecosystems, biomes, Gaia.   
In complex adaptive systems, the issue of control is even more challenging. The definition of 
“the self” used in the system of control has to be different at different levels of organization; 
and the various definitions of “the self” evolve in time. When considering complex adaptive 
systems as a whole, learning refers to integrating changes in the identities of structural and 
functional components across scales, while reflecting changes in the definition of purposes 
determined by the feed-backs received in past actions.  
Complex adaptive systems face a serious epistemological problem in defining the relation 
between the representations of functional and structural elements. The notional definition of 
functional components – i.e. what the element does – does not map in a deterministic way onto 
the notional definition of structural components – i.e. what the element is. For instance, the 
notional definition of the functional component “herbivores” of an ecosystem can represent 
herbivores as processors that establish a relation between the amount of biomass taken from 
plants and that transferred to carnivores. On the other hand, the notional definition of structural 
components will refer to any of the various species of organisms – e.g. rabbits, cows, snails – 
that display the physiological characteristics of herbivores. The effectiveness of a given 
functional-structural coupling and the use of notional definitions of functional and structural 
components can only be validated through a semiotic process by referring to a tangible 
metabolic process in which the functional definitions of processes that take place in ecosystems 
and the structural definition of processes that take place inside individual organisms are 
congruent with each other.  An ecosystem is healthy only when the aggregate characteristics of 
the mix of structural elements (categorized as “herbivores” in functional terms in the notional 
system) removes the expected amount of plant biomass from the lower level and provides the 
required amount of herbivore biomass to the upper level of carnivores. The metabolic pattern 
of an ecosystem is used to check if the mix of structural elements expresses the expected 
function.  If the ecosystem is healthy, then the structural characteristics of the populations of 
herbivorous species match the expected characteristics of the functional node herbivores.  
The concept of “holon” has been proposed by Koestler (1967; 1969; 1978) to deal with the 
systemic degeneracy of the mapping between structural and functional types in complex 
adaptive systems. In his book “The Ghost in the Machine”, Koestler (1967) shows that there is 
always an immaterial component of an organized system (the ghost is the notional part) 
associated to the meanings of the parts contributing to the expression of an emergent property 
at a different level of analysis.   
 
Step 4: The semiotic process in human society  
The epistemological problem associated with the concept of holon (a degenerate mapping 
between functional and structural type) is deep because one cannot observe structural or 
functional types as such (Giampietro, Allen, and Mayumi 2006). One can only observe instances 
(specific material realizations) of either functional or structural types. Different structural types 
(e.g., rabbits, cows, sheep) can map onto the same functional type (e.g., herbivores) and the 
same structural type (e.g., rabbit) can map onto different functional types (e.g., father, 
herbivore, meat for dinner). The distinction between instances and types is essential to learn 
and evolve. Instances can learn, types cannot. However, instances cannot evolve (they either 
live or die).  The functional and structural types associated with an instance undergo evolution, 
and they are associated with notional representations – recorded information evolving in time.  
Holons can only learn and evolve, when operating inside special realizations of holarchies.  A 
holarchy is a cascade of constituent components that play the role of both structural and 
functional elements across hierarchical levels. What makes learning and evolution possible is 
the ability to generate and update the meaning of notional representations.   
We refer to the semiotic process to explain how information is generated and updated by the 
holon. Semiotics is the study of how signs are used by a system to stabilize its identity. According 
to Peirce (1935), the semiotic process is composed of three iterative steps: (i) the production of 
signs (represent); (ii) the interpretation of signs (transduce); and (iii) the application of the sign 
to guide action (apply). This iterative process can be represented as:  
       apply  transduce  represent  transduce  apply    
Purposes and beliefs have to be preserved because they are used in the semiotic process in the 
step “transduce”. In living organisms, transducing refers to the process of converting physical 
energy into nervous signals and use nervous signals to control physical energy. 
In societies, the semiotic process can be interpreted as the interaction between three elements, 
associated with the three steps described above. In modern societies, science is in charge of 
providing the inputs for the step “represent” of the semiotic process. Scientific information is 
then transduced into policy options and recommendations for action which are fed into the 
governance process. Scientific information may be used to negotiate power relations between 
social actors and institutions, update and prioritize competing narratives, restructure the 
organization of social constituent components, and update semiotic controls.  
 Fig. 1 The semiotic process in society (adapted from Giampietro, 2018) 
 
As a result of scientific and other inputs, information is transduced in the formulation and 
implementation of policies, which are “applied” in the third step of the semiotic process. In 
figure 1, we refer to applications to the external world for simplicity. Policies may also be 
reflexively applied to the governance process itself (e.g. by introducing or updating rules and 
systems of control, by changing narratives). Iterations in the process are enacted by the reverse 
flow of information – what the society learns from the results of its actions. Applications also 
generate information about the validity of the semiotic process as a whole (learning by doing), 
which is transduced and fed into the governance process, and then used as information to define 
priorities and funding research and development activities (affecting the step represent). 
In social systems, transduce requires handling (produce, preserve, use and update) meaning. 
However, the handling of meaning required to guide action – if the light is red, then stop the car 
– requires the existence of an interpretant. The definition of the interpretant in living systems is 
not simple. For example, who is the interpretant of the information about the survival of the 
fittest used by living systems?  In natural selection individual organisms either die or survive, so 
they cannot learn how to improve their system of semiotic controls. Biological populations to 
which a specific organism belongs do not do the learning either. So we have to go up in the 
organization of the holarchy to find the right level at which the emergent property of meaning 
emerges. In figure 1, the questions about the interpretant are addressed in the upper quadrant 
when deciding about identity and purposes.  
 
Step 5: Who is us?  The contingent identity of the constituent components 
Relational analysis (Rosen 1991) studies the function of components in complex adaptive 
systems.  In particular, it addresses the mechanism through which the whole can express a 
different meaning from the meaning associated with its parts, when considered in isolation.  
According to relational analysis, self-reproducing adaptive systems are made of constituent 
components that are its functional parts. They cannot be eliminated without affecting the 
stability of the whole. The relation between the structural and functional elements of 
constituent components can be described using Aristotle’s four causes. A constituent 
component must have: (i) a final cause – it must express a function that stabilizes both the 
identity of the whole and its own identity; (ii) a formal cause – it must have a structure recorded 
in its notional representation (e.g. the blueprint); (iii) an efficient cause – it must be able to 
express agency (reproduce itself by expressing an expected behavior in the case of living 
systems); (iv) a material cause – it must be a physical realization of the notional representations 
of its structural and functional elements. 
This definition implies a bifurcation in the possible representations of the system: 
(i) Representation by downward causation: the system’s identity is defined from the 
external view, by observing how the system as a whole interacts with its context. 
According to the external view, the identity of the whole defines the identity of the 
parts. In this representation, there are two issues to be considered when assessing 
the identity of a system: (i) the external constraints (how robust the system is in 
relation to the limits associated with the availability of –dSe) and (ii) the internal 
constraints (how robust the system is in relation to the limits associated with the 
production of +dSi); and  
(ii) Representation by upward causation: the identity of the system is defined from the 
internal view, by observing how the activity of the various parts stabilizes the whole. 
According to the internal view, social systems can change both structural types (the 
formal cause – the information in the blueprints used to make structural types) and 
semiotic controls (the efficient cause – the processes used to express functions). 
However, parts inside the whole do not have any power in controlling the processes 
determining –dSe.  The parts can only assume and hope that the upper level – the 
whole which they belong to – will remain stable.  An overview of this organization 
is given in figure 2. 
 
Fig. 2 The relational analysis of the organization of the identity of a social system made up of 
constituent components 
 
The success (or failure) of maintaining the evolving set of identities of both the whole and its 
constituent components, across different hierarchical levels, represents the principle of so-
called truth that validates the information used in the semiotic process. In a holarchy, identity is 
defined through a sharing of power between upward and downward causation. The shared 
definition of identity has been called “equipollence” (Iberall, Soodak, and Arensburg 1981),  
complexification harmony (Goldberger 1997), double asymmetry (Grene 1969), and holarchic 
health (Waltner-Toews 2001).   
With this framework, it is possible to redefine the challenge of ensuring quality and integrity in 
science as part of the semiotic process of human societies. Human societies are made of 
constituent components that express awareness and reflexivity across different hierarchical 
levels (individuals, households, communities, countries, macro-institutional arrangements).   
Social constituent components have to stabilize at the same time: (i) their own identity; and (ii) 
the identity of the larger whole to which they belong. In a system organized in holarchies, 
components experience an internal yin-yang tension when coming to the definition of their final 
cause1.  In the analysis of social systems, what is good for households – not paying taxes – is bad 
for the administrative units (e.g. the town or the country) to which the households belong, and 
vice versa.  The perception of “paying taxes” is ambivalent – it can be perceived as “a very bad 
choice” by a household that does not have enough income after tax to guarantee a decent 
quality of life to the children, it can be perceived as “a very good choice” by a wealthy household 
                                                          
1 It may be observed that Freud has also proposed the co-existence of conflicting definitions of “the 
self”: one coming from the inside (the id), one coming from the outside (the superego), and one 
integrating in a compromise the two views (the ego).   
living in a wealthy country with a high quality public welfare system. This example shows that 
contrasting perceptions are not only determined by the definition of different typologies of 
constituent component – e.g. a household vs the mayor of a town – but also by the context – 
e.g. the context of the instance of household and instance of town. 
 
3. The role of science in the semiotic process of society 
In this section we discuss the role of science as constituting the step of “represent” in the 
semiotic process. In complex systems, representation needs to occur at multiple scales: the 
representation of the whole is non-equivalent to the representation of the constituent 
components, which can be represented as functional or structural components. We use the 
concept of narrative to distinguish between the multiple representations used in social systems. 
Following the literature on semiotics, we argue that representations are not objective, or 
observer-independent, accounts of observables, but are the embodiment of a narrative.  
We distinguish among three types of narratives:  
1. Justification narratives about the identity of the system as a whole  
Justification narratives are typically concerned with the implications of the dependence of the 
system on external boundary conditions (outside of human control) and the potential external 
and internal threats to the stability of these boundary conditions.  Justification narratives are 
based on a continuous monitoring and a permanent process of adjustment. At this level, 
decisions deal with the “tragedy of change” at the level of the whole (Funtowicz and Ravetz 
1990). In the limiting case, the decision to be made is about the bifurcation: (i) try to solve 
problems with adaptive changes – adjusting the identity of the constituent components and 
existing controls; or (ii) look for something else through a major re-shuffling of both the identity 
of the whole and the relative size of constituent components leading to a different shared 
perception of the identity of the whole: a revolution in the institutional setting of society. This 
type of narratives provides a set of attributes associated with the identity of the whole and of 
its constituent components. Justification narratives define “what the system is”, an operational 
definition of “the self”, and in social systems this translates into defining “who we are” and how 
“we” understand our belonging to the whole. The problem with choosing these narratives lies 
in the fact that human systems are reflexive systems: there are always several legitimate but 
contrasting narratives about the identity of the self at the level of “constituent components” 
and their relationship with the identity of the self at the level of the whole. 
 
2. Normative narratives about how to improve the constituent components.  
Normative narratives define what has to be done to improve the performance of the constituent 
components while maintaining the identity of the whole. The implementation of these 
narratives implies the creation of winners and losers in the re-definition and negotiation of the 
final causes of the various constituent components and of the definition of the final cause of the 
whole.  At this level, decisions are needed in order to deal with the “tragedy of change” at the 
level of the constituent component. When dealing with the tragedy of change and what should 
be preserved at which cost, normative narratives assess the implications of adaptive changes: 
which constituent components should be changed and how? Who is affected and how by a 
change in constituent components? If important threats are perceived, what action should be 
taken? How to handle the unavoidable presence of conflicts inside society? The choice and 
implementation of normative narratives is associated with political conflicts. 
3. Explanatory narratives used to develop anticipatory models 
Explanatory narratives are associated with the scientific enquiry and the organization of 
explanations and representations recorded by scientific knowledge. These narratives utilize 
predefined disciplinary descriptive domains (determined by a pre-analytical choice of a scale 
and a dimension of analysis) in which models can be developed to gain anticipation. They 
constitute a fragmented information space, in continuous expansion. Society has to provide a 
continuous process of validation and selection of this body of knowledge that is used to inform 
the discussion of policies inside the semiotic process.  
This last type of narrative no longer refers to the social system itself. The narratives used in 
science do not require or imply reflexivity and therefore “the self” is not included in the models. 
Scientific analysis does not address the unavoidable existence of the tragedy of change that 
affects both the whole system and its constituent components. Scientific representations 
assume that:  
(i) the definition of the identity of the social-ecological system – the justification narrative 
associated with the final cause used to define the explanatory narrative as relevant and the 
model as useful – is assumed to be uncontested; and  
(ii) the definition of normative criteria that are used to prescribe changes in the constituent 
components (implying winners and losers) are assumed to be uncontested. 
 
The limits of the contribution of scientific narratives to the semiotic process 
As a simplified heuristic, we compare the elements used to realize the semiotic process in EU 
countries: (i) before the European Union, before the internet and social media; and (ii) after the 
European Union, in an increasingly globalized economy. With this simplified account we do not 
mean to provide an accurate historical reading, nor to romanticize the past. We use this simple 
comparison as a heuristic to discuss how issues of identity may be understood in a social system. 
We start this comparison with a reflection about the reasons that may convince a citizen to be 
brave when handling with the tragedy of change.  If citizens were required to do the extreme 
sacrifice of their lives for their country (an event that occurred very often in the last 500 years 
in Europe), the question to be answered would be, why should instances of constituent 
components die to preserve the identity of the whole to which they belong?  The difference 
between the situation experienced by people that lived in European countries in the past and 
EU citizens living in the Union now is described in the two figures: Fig. 3 and Fig. 4.  
 
 
Fig. 3 Justification narrative at the level of the whole: comparison EU individual countries 1450-   
           1950 and EU 2010-? 
 
In Fig. 3 different justification narratives are examined at the level of the whole: what do “we” 
want to preserve, and how do “we” want to preserve it.  In Fig. 4 the same questions are posed 
at the level of constituent components to compare normative narratives.  The two definitions 
of “we” both at the level of the whole and at the level of the constituent components should be 
kept in congruence with each other. 
 
 
Fig. 4 Justification narrative at the level of the whole: comparison EU individual countries 1450-   
            1950 and EU 2010-? 
 
This comparison suggests that the task of keeping coherence over the two definitions of “we” 
across levels was easier in the past.  In the past, the identity of the whole was associated with 
signs related to a specific icon of the whole – our king, our homeland, our kind (left side of figure 
3).  In this situation, the continuity of the individuality – France in 1750 was still France in 1950 
even though its structural and functional elements were totally different – was guaranteed by 
the way used by France (and French people) to preserve beliefs, purposes, and values. This 
continuity was also reinforced by the tangible and spatial definition of the constituent 
components – i.e. French provinces, cities, household types. On the contrary, when looking at 
what is proposed to EU citizens today, there is nothing tangible or directly controlled by EU 
citizens that can be used to define their own identity across the two levels (the whole and the 
constituent components), or to decide what to retain and what to lose in the original identity 
when becoming something else. The identity of the whole is associated with a set of semantically 
ambiguous attributes (peace, justice, welfare) and the strategy to defend this identity is left to 
the agency of the market, human ingenuity and technical progress.  There is little that can give 
EU citizens a feeling of empowerment in relation to their agency to protect the whole to which 
they belong. Citizens became consumers.   
The situation is even more ambiguous at the constituent component level (see figure 4). EU 
citizens now are no longer identifiable with specific realizations of constituent components. 
They are consumers whose necessities are guaranteed by the proper functioning of the global 
market in which functional and structural elements cannot be clearly identified. This may explain 
the continuous need felt by the new generation of EU citizens to take pictures of themselves in 
order to have something reassuring them in relation to their identity.  
The evidence-based policy approach seems to be based on the assumption that it is possible to 
define road map towards progress based on a generic definition of performance that does not 
require a contextualization in relation to the special identity of the society in which it is applied. 
As a consequence, normative narratives are excluded from scientific discussion and are 
naturalized as assumptions in scientific narratives, through an institutional process of conflation 
of the technical and the social, as captured by the concept of socio-technical imaginaries 
(Jasanoff and Kim 2009). The big difference between the situation in the past and the situation 
now is that the semiotic process in the past involved directly the various instances of constituent 
components in the discussion of how to deal with the tragedy of change. On the contrary, a 
policy making based on rationality imagines that it is possible for a committee of experts and 
other elected or not-elected functionaries without “skin in the game” (Taleb 2018) to decide 
which normative narrative should be used to change the identity of special instances.  
 
The post-truth world as a crisis of the semiotic process of science and the inability of modern 
societies to cope with the tragedy of change 
Science works well when it provides the semiotic process an input of information useful to 
achieve semantic closure. Semantic closure can be associated with the concept of 
correspondence in philosophy of science, which is used to define truth. That is, a statement is 
considered true if it corresponds with the shared perception of the external world. However, 
modern science can only guarantee truth by fixing both the type of observer and the type of 
observation in time, abstracting from the special characteristics and the becoming of instances. 
In complex adaptive systems, the definition of relevance and usefulness of observations need to 
be constantly updated and the identity of the observer is constantly changing. We argue that 
modern science, by focusing only on explanatory narratives and by excluding by default the 
implications of the pre-analytical discussion of justification and normative narratives, cannot 
contribute to an effective update of the semiotic process considered as a whole. By focusing 
exclusively on “how” questions, science is not capable of addressing the associated “why” 
questions. This means that the information provided by science is useful only in the short run 
and when applied to specific issues, as long as the identity of the whole and the identity of the 
constituent components remains the same.  Whenever faced with the tragedy of change, 
modern science cannot provide semiotic closure.  This is the key implication of Post-Normal 
Science (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1990; 1993; Funtowicz et al. 1998). 
In the context of complex adaptive systems, decision making is not just about solving local 
problems, but has to deal with the following questions related to the evolution of the identity 
of both the systems and the survival of the instances of its constituent components:  
*How to make decisions under uncertainty?  
*How to handle stress caused by uncertainty and by changes of identity? How to act when facing 
painful and risky decisions regarding changes in the identity of constituent components?   
* How to decide which beliefs and purposes have to be preserved if the decisions lead to 
contrasting effects on the (dual) identity of the whole and of the constituent components? 
We believe that in relation to these set of question the knowledge associated with rationality 
has very little to contribute.  The tragedy of change requires updating the identity of the self. 
The semiotic process does not deal with the preservation of “types” (what is observed by 
science) but rather with the survival of the “instance” through adaptation. The key questions 
escape the realm of modern scientific inquiry: How do we know who is “we”?  What should “we” 
believe in?  When faced with change and adaptation, everything becomes special. The self is a 
given instance and at the same time a negotiated identity.  In this situation intuition or faith can 
be as useful as recorded experience (especially when dealing with first time events) in guiding 
decision making.    
In the last years, and especially after the negative effect of the economic crises and stagnation 
on the European welfare state, an increasing fraction of people no longer trust the story-telling 
of the elites in power. As a consequence of this loss of trust in the elites of experts and policy-
makers, more and more people do not trust the main narratives endorsed by the scientific 
establishment. The reciprocal legitimation that followed in Western countries the successful 
validation of the enlightenment in the semiotic process (when science replaced religion in its 
role of legitimization of the establishment) is quickly reverting to a reciprocal de-legitimation in 
the first decades of the third millennium. The crisis of legitimacy of the establishment, identified 
as post-truth politics, is destabilizing science. 
 
4. Quality and integrity of science in the semiotic process 
Drawing from the understanding of society as a complex adaptive, becoming and anticipatory 
system, and building on the description of the role of science as part of the semiotic process 
through which societies maintain their identity, we now turn to our out-of-the-box discussion of 
integrity and quality in science. 
The concept of integrity can be associated with the capacity of a semiotic process to produce 
useful meanings that preserve the identity of an autopoietic system through its process of 
becoming in time. The feeling of living in a post-truth world signals the failure of the semiotic 
process in guaranteeing an effective update of the integrated set of identities expressed by a 
socio-economic system. This failure is associated with the emergence of a crisis in the step 
represent (scientific inquiry).  The symptoms are well known: scientific misconduct (production 
of invalid signs), the reproducibility and retraction crises (corruption of the process used to 
generate meaningful signs), and public mistrust (loss of confidence of the interpretant in the 
proposed signs).  The representation provided by science is no longer useful for society and the 
validation provided by society to the information used to guide action is no longer useful for 
science.   
Because of disciplinary specialization, science provides partial analyses, that can be very 
accurate but that can only be used to explain one problem at the time. As soon science 
(especially quantitative science) is forced to deal with complex issues – e.g. the nexus and the 
sustainability of economic growth – in which information has to be handled in a coherent way 
across scales and not just across dimensions, the existence of these limits becomes clear. The 
persistent ambiguity of the meaning of the term nexus in relation to policy and sustainability 
(Cairns & Krzywoszynska 2016; Giampietro, 2018) is a recent example of the limits of science.  
Quality can be defined in different ways and at different levels of the semiotic process. At the 
level of the whole, quality has to do with the ability of preserving a shared definition of the 
identity of the whole and a satisficing definition of purposes. Purposes may need to be updated 
because of the accumulation of experience and/or because of the insurgence of new feelings. 
At the level of components, quality of information may be expressed as fitness for purpose 
(Funtowicz and Ravetz 1992). This definition of quality takes a pragmatic approach that is 
compatible with changes in purposes and identity.  
In the field of semiotics, a crucial element in the construction of signs is the interpretant for 
which the sign is meant. For example, walking sticks base their survival strategy on their iconicity 
to twigs. How predators see (or fail to see) them matters vitally in the sign process through which 
walking sticks interact with the world (Kohn 2013). The quality of the representation (similarity 
to twigs) is decided by the semiotic process. If the similarity is correctly interpreted by predators 
(interpretant), walking sticks will not to be eaten. Semiotic processes are highly contextual, as 
the iconicity of walking sticks depends on them being in a forest. Quality is defined in relation to 
the interpretant.  
The key role of the interpretant in the semiotic process is at odds with the conception of quality 
as objectivity in modern science. Disciplinary science requires for scientists to be types. This 
explains why scientists are not expected to use the first person in orthodox scientific papers. 
The expression “I know very well” is considered to be not scientific, scientist have to use the 
expression “it is well known”.  Scientists cannot be instances (Dr. Smith), they must be typologies 
of story-tellers (e.g. reputable biologist) that describe the expected interactions of typologies of 
agents using a set of attributes determined by the disciplinary story-telling.  Accepting this 
framing entails that later on the scientific output must be used only by the expected typologies 
of interpretants!  For this reason the attribute “beautiful” is very rarely used in scientific 
representations. Models are used to generate explanations and predictions whose usefulness 
depends on the validity of the narrative within which they have been generated. This means 
that there is no possibility of checking the usefulness of models from inside the discipline that 
generated them.  One has to check their usefulness with those using the models for guiding 
action.  The post-truth society can be explained by a progressive lack of coherence in the 
coupling of scientific narrators (those generating the representations) and the interpretants of 
the representations (those that use the chosen narratives for guiding action).   
Konig et al. (2017) contrast the norms of quality in science with examples of misconduct. This 
exercise shows how quality standards are associated with types, while problems emerge in the 
behaviour of instances. For example, transparency is considered a norm of quality in science. 
However, its opposite, defined as hiding interests and intentions, can only be attributed to a 
specific scientist (an instance), not to a discipline or an abstract scientific community. With 
regard to best practices, trans-disciplinarity is seen as a potential solution to the partial view of 
disciplinary silos. Indeed trans-disciplinarity requires integrating many-to-one mappings – non-
equivalent typologies of representations describing the same instance.  However, when 
contributing to transdisciplinary processes instance of scientists are still trapped in the 
typologies of perceptions and representations of their original disciplinary approach. For this 
reason, transdisciplinarity is very challenging in practice.  
The analysis of the semiotic process shows that decisions that affect the evolution of societies 
are taken by instances (people having skin in the game). These instances have interests, agendas, 
normative values and points of view.  This obvious fact should be acknowledged and dealt with 
in the process of production and use of science for governance.  This is the challenge proposed 
by Post-Normal Science (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993). Scientists are just another typology of 
agents and instances involved in the semiotic process, and for this reason they are affected by 
the dualities: “instance/type” and “the self/the other”. These dualities entail the need to go 
through the tragedy of change in the process of becoming. The systemic exclusion of “the self” 
– both in terms of constituent component defining the purpose of the analysis and in terms of 
the scientist carrying out the analysis – from scientific models, limits the possibility of assessing 
quality and integrity in science. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In conclusion, in order to properly use the scientific input in the semiotic process it is essential 
to critically reflect on what type of input can be given by science and what type of inputs cannot 
be given. Being critical is not about being pro science (doing marches to protect the 
enlightenment against the “endarkment”) or being against science (promoting superstition and 
witchery).  The discussion is totally different. The emergence of the post-truth debate suggests 
that large parts of society feel that the scientific inputs used in the process of decision making 
at the moment does not have semiotic closure. Intoxicated by the promises and the success of 
the enlightenment, modern societies may have attributed to science powers that it does not 
have.  According to this analysis, it is obvious that this crisis is not a fault of scientific inquiry, but 
it urges a reflection of how science is used in the semiotic process. 
We argue that semiotic closure requires the ability of integrating explanatory narratives in 
relation to the re-discussion of the identity of the self: addressing the implications of the tragedy 
of change. Modern science provides no cosmological vision, except for the contradictory 
explanation of the big bang (before which there was no time) generating an expanding universe 
(outside which there is no space), but no information about the complex relation of “the self” 
with “the other”.   
Information associated with rationality or the agreement on a set of shared ethical guiding 
principles does not cover all the types of information required to operate the semiotic process.  
When considering the identity of Japan in 2018 and Japan in 1518, one can conclude that Japan 
did not retain in its identity the same rational explanations nor normative narratives of 500 years 
ago.  So what type of attributes of the identity of Japan remained in its evolutionary path?  These 
attributes are not directly considered in scientific analysis, especially in quantitative analysis: (i) 
a shared feeling of belonging to something superior to the constituent component; (ii) shared 
symbols of identity translating into a commitment and responsibility to achieve a common set 
of goals; and (iii) the modalities used to deal with the tragedy of change through the semiotic 
process (including re-starting from scratch after the Second World War).  This type of 
information essential for a semiotic process is not generated by modern scientific inquiry.   
Science can overcome the crisis of trust only through a restoration of the integrity of the 
semiotic process.  In order to be able to receive effective feed-backs from the society, science 
should be used to structure the debate about controversial topics, to make sense of multiple 
non-equivalent representations of the same issue, to acknowledge and use uncertainty and 
complexity. This requires a move from a substantive use of science as a source of facts about 
the world, to a more reflexive use of science as a process making sense of information useful to 
handle the stress associated with a continuous update of the identity of the self. 
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